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TACKLING UNDECLARED WORK IN THE 
EUROPEAN UNION: AN EVALUATION OF 
GOVERNMENT POLICY APPROACHES 
 
 
 
Colin C. Williams1 
 
 
 
Abstract  
In recent years, it has been increasingly recognised that governments seeking to tackle undeclared work 
effectively should adopt a holistic approach. This seeks to coordinate strategy across the fields of labour, tax 
and social security law, and to use the full range of policy measures available. The aim of this paper is to 
evaluate the extent to which European Union member states adopt such an integrated holistic approach when 
tackling undeclared work by coordinating strategy across the fields of labour, tax and social security law, and 
using the full range of policy measures available. Reporting a 2017 survey of the official representatives of the 
national governments on the European Commission’s European Platform Tackling Undeclared Work, the 
finding is that most national governments continue to adopt an uncoordinated fragmented approach to strategy 
and use only a limited range of mostly deterrent policy measures. The paper concludes by discussing how a 
more holistic approach could be achieved across EU member states. 
 
Keywords: informal economy; tax evasion; public policy; European Union. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
It is now widely accepted that undeclared work remains a persistent and often extensive 
feature of European Union (EU) economies (Dotti et al. 2015; Medina and Schneider 
2017; Williams 2014b; Williams and Schneider 2016). Indeed, a recent European 
Commission report estimates that 9.3% of labour input in the private sector in the EU is 
undeclared work (Williams et al. 2017). This has negative implications for the workers 
involved, who have poorer working conditions, lower wages, infringements of their 
labour rights and reduced protection under labour and social protection law, depriving 
them of adequate social benefits, pension rights and access to healthcare, as well as skills 
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development and lifelong learning opportunities (European Commission 2016; ILO 
2015). It also results in unfair competition for businesses operating legitimately, and 
decreases tax and social security revenues for member states, undermining the financial 
sustainability of their social protection systems (European Commission 2016; Williams 
2014a, 2018).  
Tackling undeclared work is therefore high on the agenda in the EU (European 
Commission 1998, 2007, 2016). Indeed, in 2016, the European Parliament passed 
legislation establishing the European Platform Tackling Undeclared Work (henceforth 
referred to as ‘the Platform’) to improve the cooperation and effectiveness of Member 
States in tackling undeclared work (European Commission 2016). This recognised the 
need for a more holistic approach to be adopted, which the first Platform meeting of the 
member states and social partners defined as a whole government strategic approach 
which joins-up the fields of labour, tax and social security law, and which uses the full 
range of direct and indirect policy measures available to enhance the power of, and trust 
in, authorities respectively (Williams 2016). The aim of this paper is to evaluate the 
degree to which EU member states currently adopt such a holistic approach towards 
tackling undeclared work. This is one of the first known assessments of how 
governments are addressing undeclared work. 
To do this, the first section will set the context by briefly reviewing the extant 
literature which recognises that a more joined-up coordinated approach towards tackling 
undeclared work is needed if it is to be effectively tackled, followed by how a holistic 
policy approach is widely recognised as required in order to effectively tackle undeclared 
work both in the scholarly and practitioner literature. The second section then reports the 
methodology used to evaluate the degree to which European national governments have 
adopted this holistic approach, whilst the third section will report the findings. Revealing 
that most governments do not have a joined-up strategy and only a limited range of 
measures are used in most member states, with deterrence measures the most commonly 
used, the fourth and final section will then draw some conclusions about the implications 
and discuss the future research required. 
 
 
1. REVIEWING POLICY APPROACHES TOWARDS UNDECLARED WORK IN THE 
EUROPEAN UNION 
 
Undeclared work is known by many names, with some 45 different nouns and 10 
adjectives used to denote this realm, including the ‘cash-in-hand’, ‘shadow’, ‘informal’, 
‘black’ and ‘underground’ economy/sector/work (Williams 2004). However, despite this 
array of names, a strong consensus exists over how to define it in both the scholarly and 
policy-making community. What is here termed ‘undeclared work’ is defined in terms 
of what is absent from, or insufficient about, it compared with declared work, and the 
consensus is that the only absence from, or insufficiency about, undeclared work is that 
this paid work is not declared to the authorities for tax, social security and/or labour law 
purposes when it should be declared (European Commission 1998, 2007; OECD 2002; 
Williams 2004; Williams and Windebank 1998).  
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Given this definition of undeclared work as paid work not declared to the authorities 
for tax, social security and/or labour law purposes when it should be declared, three key 
reasons can be identified why these otherwise lawful activities are not declared: 
• To evade payment of income, value added or other taxes;  
• To evade payment of social security contributions; and  
• To evade certain legal labour standards, such as minimum wages, maximum 
hours, safety standards, etc. 
In most member states, separate government departments take responsibility for each 
of these three aspects of evasion, namely tax administrations for tax non-compliance, 
social security institutions for social insurance non-compliance and labour inspectorates 
and/or ministries for labour law violations. Previous studies intimate that collaboration 
and joined-up coordinated approaches towards the undeclared economy across such 
authorities is rare, and that for undeclared work to be effectively tackled, a more joined-
up cross-government approach is required (Dekker et al. 2010; Williams 2014a; 
Williams and Nadin 2012).  
The legislative decision of the European Parliament establishing the European 
Platform Tackling Undeclared Work recognised this and called for a more holistic 
approach towards tackling undeclared work to be adopted (European Commission 2016). 
This was subsequently defined at the first Platform meeting of the member states and 
social partners as a whole government approach that joins-up strategy across the fields 
of labour, tax and social security law, and uses the full range of direct and indirect policy 
measures available to enhance the power of, and trust in, authorities respectively 
(Williams 2016, 2017). Until now, however, no evaluation has been conducted of the 
degree to which national governments in the European Union have adopted a joined-up 
and coordinated approach towards undeclared work. This, therefore, is the first issue that 
needs to be investigated when evaluating the degree to which a holistic approach towards 
undeclared work has been adopted across the European Union.   
The second issue requiring investigation to evaluate the degree to which a holistic 
approach has been adopted is whether national governments use the full range of direct 
and indirect policy measures. Conventionally, governments have pursued the eradication 
of undeclared work by treating participants in undeclared work as ‘rational economic 
actors’ who engage in undeclared work when the benefits outweigh the expected costs 
of being caught and punished (Allingham and Sandmo 1972; Grabiner 2000; Hasseldine 
and Li 1999; Richardson and Sawyer 2001). As such, a deterrence approach has been 
used which firstly, raises the perceived or actual likelihood of detection and secondly, 
increases the penalties and sanctions for those caught (Williams 2014, 2017, 2018).  
In recent decades, however, the validity of this deterrence approach has been 
questioned for three reasons. Firstly, there is the issue of its effectiveness. Although some 
studies find that increasing fines and the risk of detection reduces undeclared work 
(Masud et al. 2015; Mazzolini et al. 2017), others find no significant association (Shaw 
et al. 2008), and yet others that it results in higher levels of undeclared work because it 
leads to a breakdown in the social contract between the state and its citizens (Hofmann 
et al. 2017; Kaplanoglou and Rapano 2015; Murphy 2008; Murphy and Harris 2007; 
Schneider and Enste 2002; Windebank and Horodnic 2017).  
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Secondly, it has been recognised that much undeclared work is self-employment and 
that the undeclared economy acts as a seedbed for entrepreneurship and enterprise 
development (Autio and Fu 2015; Siqueira et al. 2016; Webb et al. 2009, 2013; Williams 
2004, 2006, 2018, Williams et al. 2012). This has resulted in an understanding that if 
national governments try to eradicate such activity using deterrents, they will with one 
hand eradicate the entrepreneurship and enterprise culture that with other hands they are 
seeking to foster to achieve economic development and growth (Williams 2006, 2018). 
Thirdly, eradicating undeclared work fails to address the long-standing problem of 
increasing employment participation rates in Europe. In 2017, according to Eurostat, 72.1 
per cent of the working age population (aged 20–64 years old) in the EU28 were in jobs. 
For these reasons, it has been recognised that governments need to transform 
undeclared work into declared work rather than simply eradicate it (European 
Commission 2007, 2016; ILO 2015; SBC 2004; Williams 2006, 2017, 2018). Indeed, 
ILO Recommendation 204 adopted by United Nations member states explicitly 
recognises that the objective is to formalise the informal economy (ILO 2015), as does 
the Platform legislation which explicitly states that the objective should be to transform 
undeclared work into declared work (European Commission 2016).To do so, there is a 
need to move beyond conventional deterrence measures which, although useful for 
eradicating undeclared work, do not facilitate the transformation of undeclared work into 
declared work. This is the rationale behind the call for a holistic approach which uses the 
full range of direct and indirect policy measures.   
Direct policy measures reduce the costs and increase the benefits of operating on a 
declared basis as well as increase the costs and reduce the benefits of operating 
undeclared. Viewing those participants as rational economic actors, the objective is to 
alter the cost/benefit ratio confronting them. To do this, there are on the one hand 
deterrence measures that increase the costs of participating in undeclared work by either 
raising the penalties for those caught and/or increasing the perceived or actual likelihood 
of detection. On the other hand, there are also incentive measures that make it easier to 
undertake, and reward, participation in declared work. The intention of direct policy 
measures is to increase the power of authorities to elicit compliant behaviour by changing 
the cost/benefit ratio (Kirchler 2007; Williams 2018).  
Indirect policy measures, meanwhile, recognise that participants are not just rational 
economic actors (purely calculating the costs and benefits) because many do not engage 
in undeclared work even when the benefits of doing so outweigh the costs (Kirchler 
2007; Murphy 2005, 2008; Murphy and Harris 2007). Instead, they are viewed as social 
actors who engage in undeclared work when formal institutional failings lead them to 
adopt norms and beliefs regarding participation in undeclared work that do not align with 
the laws and regulations, for example due to a lack of trust in the state and what it is 
seeking to achieve (Horodnic 2018; Williams and Horodnic 2015). Indirect policy 
approaches, therefore, seek to either change the norms, values and beliefs regarding the 
acceptability of participating in undeclared work, so that these are in symmetry with the 
laws and regulations (e.g. using awareness raising campaigns), and/or to change the 
formal institutional imperfections that lead to a lack of alignment between the norms, 
values and beliefs of the population, and the laws and regulations. 
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Until now, few studies have evaluated the policy approaches used by national 
governments. One early attempt by Williams (2008) examined the 2001 and 2003 
National Action Plans for Employment (NAPs) and the National Reform Programmes 
2005–2008 (NRPs) of each member state, along with two international reviews of the 
initiatives being pursued in different countries (European Employment Observatory 
2004; European Industrial Relations Observatory 2005). In 2001, the finding is that most 
measures adopted were repressive. Following the publication of Employment Guideline 
no. 9 in 2003, when the Commission called for undeclared work to be transformed into 
declared work, however, although repressive measures remained widely used, mostly 
West European and Nordic countries began to use some incentive measures. By 2005, 
this tendency had spread to a wider range of countries. Largely absent, however, was the 
use of indirect policy measures (Williams 2008). 
In 2010, meanwhile, as part of the feasibility study for the establishment of the 
European Platform Tackling Undeclared Work, Dekker et al. (2010) conducted a web-
based survey of government officials in national labour inspectorates, revenue 
administrations, social security administrations, trade unions, employer organisations 
and other relevant agencies (e.g., customs, border police, immigration). Of the 499 
invitations to participate, 104 responded (a 21% response rate). Some 90% of countries 
had adopted one or more incentive policy measure. The problem with this survey, 
however, was that the respondents did not possess a good overview of the full range of 
policy measures used in their country, as witnessed by policy measures being omitted in 
responses when it was known that they existed in the respondent’s country. 
 
 
2. METHODOLOGY 
 
In 2017, therefore, the decision was taken by the Platform to evaluate the extent to which 
firstly, there exists a joined-up strategic approach in national governments in the EU, and 
secondly, the degree to which the full range of direct and indirect policy measures are 
used. This e-survey was designed by the consortium holding the four-year service 
contract to provide expert services to the Platform, of which the author of this paper is 
the lead expert. The survey methodology and questionnaire design went through several 
rounds of quality assurance by the European Commission’s Platform Secretariat, and a 
pilot survey was also conducted on two Member States. This resulted in changes to the 
questionnaire design (e.g., advice being given on how to answer questions). 
The intention of the survey was firstly, to gather information on the extent to which 
there is a joined-up coordinated approach in each member state and secondly, the range 
of policy measures used in each member state, as well as which are the dominant policy 
measures, and which are considered most effective. To do this, a detailed list was 
provided of the full range of policy measures (see Table 2 below).   
The questionnaire was sent to the national representative of each member state for 
completion. When the Platform was established in 2016, each member state officially 
nominated a national representative to act as a liaison or point of contact between the 
Member State and the Platform. When these national representatives receive requests for 
information on their Member State, their practice is to circulate the request around the 
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relevant Ministries and enforcement authorities involved in tackling undeclared work to 
gather the required information. The same process was used by the national 
representatives when answering this e-survey.  
Responses were received from 23 of the 28 Member States. Of those national 
representatives coordinating the gathering of the national response to this survey, 15 
were from the Labour Inspectorate in their member state, four from their Ministry of 
Labour, two from their tax administration, two from the Customs Authority, one from a 
social security institution and three ‘other’ organisations, namely the professional 
governance of the labour authority, an occupational safety and health prevention 
authority, and a Ministry of Social Affairs/Department for OSH. Below, the findings are 
reported of this first ever evaluation of the policy approaches that national governments 
adopt towards undeclared work. 
 
 
3. FINDINGS 
 
To evaluate the extent to which a holistic approach has been adopted to tackle undeclared 
work by the 23 national governments responding, firstly, whether a joined-up approach 
is adopted across government is evaluated, and secondly, whether the full range of policy 
measures available are used.  
Table 1 reveals that only a quarter of the 23 Member States responding have a 
‘joined-up’ strategic approach with one set of national targets for tackling undeclared 
work common across the whole of government, implemented by a single agency or 
institution which is responsible for tackling all these facets of undeclared work. 
Examples include the Financial Control of Undeclared Work Unit (FKS) in Germany 
and the Shadow Economy Combating Board in Latvia. 
In three-quarters of Member States, therefore, there is no strategic joined-up common 
set of targets. Instead, the most frequently adopted structure is a departmental ‘silos’ 
approach, with each authority responsible for different legislative aspects of undeclared 
work, with each having its own separate targets. This fragmentation of responsibilities 
across different government authorities means that in most Member States, and this is 
especially the case in Southern Europe, a coordinated strategic approach towards tackling 
undeclared work is absent. 
 
Table 1. How are the national targets for tackling undeclared work in your Member State best 
described? 
Category EU Western 
Europe 
Nordic 
nations 
East-Central 
Europe 
Southern 
Europe 
Common across all relevant 
departments 
26% 29% 33% 33% 0% 
Some shared but mostly separate for 
each department 
13% 14% 0% 11% 25% 
Separate targets for each department 57% 57% 67% 44% 75% 
No response 4% 0% 0% 11% 0% 
Total (%) 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Total 23 7 3 9 4 
Source: author analysis of 2017 European Platform Tackling Undeclared Work survey. 
Colin C. Williams. 2019. Tackling Undeclared Work in the European Union: An Evaluation of Government Policy 
Approaches. UTMS Journal of Economics 10 (2): 135–147. 
 
 
   
  
 
 
141 
Table 2 reports the results on the range of policy measures used. This reveals that 
deterrence measures are used in nearly all the Member States responding (especially 
penalties and workplace inspections) and the only deterrence measures not widely used 
are mandatory identity cards in the workplace and the use of supply chain responsibility.  
However, incentives to make declared work beneficial and easier are less commonly 
used. More particularly, supply-side incentives (especially the simplification of 
procedures) are more commonly used than demand-side incentives (which are only used 
by a quarter to one third of Member States). Meanwhile, indirect measures to raise 
awareness about the costs of undeclared work and benefits of declared work are common 
across the EU, although greater emphasis is put on campaigns which highlight the costs of 
undeclared work whilst fewer campaigns emphasise the benefits of declared work. 
Measures to modernise enforcement authorities in terms of the degree to which customers 
believe they have been treated in a respectful, impartial and responsible manner are 
currently pursued by less than half of all Member States. 
 
Table 2. % of Member States using policy measures: by EU region, 2017 
POLICY MEASURE 
EU 
 
Western 
Europe 
Nordic East- 
Central 
Europe 
Southern 
Europe 
n=23 n=7 n=3 n=9 n=4 
DIRECT DETERRENCE MEASURES      
Penalties      
Use of penalties and fines for companies 96% 100% 100% 89% 100% 
Use of penalties and fines for purchasers 43% 71% 67% 33% 0% 
Use of ‘blacklists’  35% 57% 0% 33% 25% 
Measures to improve detection      
Data matching and sharing 96% 100% 100% 89% 100% 
Workplace inspections 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Registration of workers prior to starting work 
or on first day/week of work 
87% 71% 67% 100% 100% 
Coordination of strategy on undeclared work 
across government departments 
83% 86% 100% 89% 50% 
Coordination of operations across 
government departments (e.g., joint 
operations/workplace inspections) 
87% 100% 100% 78% 75% 
Coordination of data mining and sharing 
across government departments 
83% 100% 100% 78% 50% 
Use of peer-to-peer surveillance (e.g. 
telephone hotlines to inform about 
abuses/cases) 
87% 86% 100% 100% 50% 
Certification of business, certifying payments 
of social contributions and taxes 
74% 86% 67% 78% 50% 
Use of mandatory ID in the workplace 48% 71% 67% 44% 0% 
Supply chain responsibility 43% 71% 0% 44% 25% 
DIRECT INCENTIVES      
Supply-side incentives      
Simplify procedures for complying to existing 
regulations 
78% 86% 100% 56% 100% 
 
.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  
Colin C. Williams. 2019. Tackling Undeclared Work in the European Union: An Evaluation of Government Policy 
Approaches. UTMS Journal of Economics 10 (2): 135–147. 
 
 
   
  
 
 
142 
Table 2. (continued) 
POLICY MEASURE 
EU 
 
Western 
Europe 
Nordic East- 
Central 
Europe 
Southern 
Europe 
n=23 n=7 n=3 n=9 n=4 
Society-wide amnesties 17% 14% 0% 22% 25% 
Individual-level amnesties for voluntarily 
disclosing undeclared activity 
17% 29% 0% 11% 25% 
‘Formalisation’ advice to start-ups 65% 86% 100% 56% 25% 
‘Formalisation’ support services to existing 
businesses 
61% 86% 100% 44% 25% 
Direct tax incentives (e.g., exemptions, 
deductions) 
65% 71% 67% 67% 50% 
Targeted VAT reductions  43% 43% 67% 44% 25% 
Provide free record-keeping software to 
businesses 
9% 14% 33% 0% 0% 
Provide fact sheets on record-keeping 
requirements 
43% 43% 100% 44% 0% 
Provide free advice/training on record-
keeping 
48% 57% 33% 44% 50% 
Demand-side incentives      
Service vouchers 26% 43% 33% 11% 25% 
Targeted direct tax incentives (e.g., income 
tax reduction/subsidy) 
35% 43% 67% 33% 0% 
Targeted indirect taxes (e.g., VAT 
reductions) 
30% 43% 33% 22% 25% 
Initiatives for customers to request receipts 
(e.g., Lottery for receipts) 
26% 14% 33% 33% 25% 
INDIRECT MEASURES      
Campaigns to inform suppliers of undeclared 
work of the risks and costs of working 
undeclared 
83% 86% 100% 78% 75% 
Campaigns to inform suppliers of undeclared 
work of the benefits of formalising their work 
(e.g., informing them where their taxes are 
spent) 
52% 29% 67% 67% 50% 
Campaigns to inform users of undeclared 
work of the problems of purchasing goods 
and services form the undeclared economy 
57% 57% 100% 56% 25% 
Campaigns to inform users of undeclared 
work of the benefits of declared work (e.g., 
informing citizens of the public goods and 
services they receive with the taxes 
collected) 
61% 43% 100% 67% 50% 
Normative appeals to businesses to operate 
on a declared basis  
48% 57% 67% 33% 50% 
Measures to improve the degree to which 
customers of enforcement agencies believe 
they have been treated in a respectful, 
impartial and responsible manner 
48% 57% 100% 33% 25% 
Measures to improve tax/social 
contributions/ labour law knowledge 
78% 86% 100% 67% 75% 
Source: author analysis of 2017 European Platform Tackling Undeclared Work survey. 
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Comparing the policy measures used in different EU regions, Table 2 reveals that 
although deterrence measures are widely used across all EU regions, the range of measures 
used is relatively narrower in Southern Europe. Meanwhile, West European and Nordic 
nations more commonly use supply- and demand-side incentives than Southern and East-
Central European nations. This is exemplified by the widespread use of formalisation 
advice to start-ups and formalisation support services to existing businesses in Western 
Europe and Nordic nations but such services are far less common in Southern and East-
Central Europe. This suggests that Southern and East-Central European Member States 
might consider using a wider range of supply- and demand-side incentives.  
Indirect measures, meanwhile, are very prevalent in Nordic nations but less common 
in Southern and Western European countries and when used, they tend to focus upon the 
costs of undeclared work rather than the benefits of declared work, with only 29% of 
West European Member States for example informing suppliers of undeclared work of 
the benefits of formalising their work (e.g., informing them where their taxes are spent). 
Modernising enforcement authorities by treating customers in a respectful, impartial and 
responsible manner is again more common in Western Europe and Nordic nations than 
in Southern and East-Central Europe. 
However, Table 2 only shows whether each policy measure is used. It does not capture 
which policy measures are deemed most important when tackling undeclared work and are 
heavily relied upon with greater resources devoted to them, and which measures are used 
but are not central and heavily resourced. To do this, respondents were asked to rank the 
most important measures used to tackle undeclared work in their Member State. Table 3 
shows that across the EU, deterrence measures in the form of penalties are ranked the most 
important measure followed by measures to improve detection. This is then followed by 
supply-side incentives and awareness raising campaigns, whilst demand-side incentives 
and measures to change the formal institutions are viewed as least important. 
There are, however, differences between EU regions. In Nordic nations, detection 
measures rather than penalties are ranked as most important, and in Southern Europe as 
equally most important. In stark contrast, detection measures are ranked the least 
important measures in East-Central Europe. Instead, far greater emphasis in East-Central 
Europe is put on indirect measures including both awareness raising campaigns to change 
norms, values and beliefs and the modernisation of formal institutions. 
 
Table 3. Platform members’ views of the relative importance attached to different types of policy 
measures in their Member State: from most dominant (1st) to least dominant (6th) 
Type of policy measure EU Western 
Europe 
Nordic 
nations 
East-
Central 
Europe 
Southern 
Europe 
Deterrence: Penalties 1 1 2 1 1 
Deterrence: Measures to improve detection 2 2 1 6 1 
Incentives: supply-side 3 4 3 4 4 
Incentives: demand-side 5 5 4 5 5 
Indirect measures: awareness raising campaigns 4 3 5 3 3 
Indirect measures: changing formal institutions  6 6 6 2 6 
Source: 2017 European Platform Tackling Undeclared Work survey. 
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Not only are deterrence measures deemed the most important type of measure to 
tackle undeclared work but also the most effective across the EU member states. As 
Table 4 displays, Western European countries and Nordic nations rank penalties as most 
effective and measures to improve detection 2nd most effective. Southern European 
countries rank penalties 2nd most effective and measures to improve detection 1st. East-
Central European countries rank penalties 3rd, awareness raising campaigns 1st and 
indirect measures aimed at changing formal institutions 2nd most effective (which are 
seen by other Member State groups as the least effective). 
 
Table 4. Type of policy measures viewed as most and least effective by Member State: rank order 
from most effective (1st) to least effective (6th) 
Type of policy measure EU Western 
Europe 
Nordic 
nations 
East-
Central 
Europe 
Southern 
Europe 
Deterrence: Penalties 1 1 1 3 2 
Deterrence: Measures to improve detection 2 2 2 4 1 
Incentives: supply-side 4 4 2 5 3 
Incentives: demand-side 5 4 4 5 5 
Indirect measures: awareness raising campaigns 3 3 5 1 4 
Indirect measures: changing formal institutions  6 6 6 2 6 
Source: 2017 European Platform Tackling Undeclared Work survey. 
 
 
4. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
This paper has evaluated the extent to which European national governments have 
adopted a holistic approach towards tackling undeclared work. This holistic approach 
adopts joined-up strategy across the fields of labour, tax and social security law, and uses 
the full range of policy measures available. To do so, data was collected in a 2017 survey 
of the official representatives of the national governments on the Platform. The finding 
is that only a quarter of Member States responding have a ‘joined-up’ strategic approach 
with one set of national targets for tackling undeclared work common across the whole 
of government. Moreover, only a limited range of policy measures are used, with 
deterrents used in nearly all the member states responding. However, incentives to make 
declared work beneficial and easier are less commonly used, with supply-side incentives 
more commonly used than demand-side incentives (which are only used by a quarter to 
one third of member states responding). Indirect measures to raise awareness about the 
costs of undeclared work and benefits of declared work are common across the EU, but 
measures to modernise enforcement authorities in terms of the degree to which customers 
believe they have been treated in a respectful, impartial and responsible manner are 
currently pursued by less than half of all member states. Deterrence, moreover, remains 
the policy approach accorded the most importance, and is also seen as more effective at 
tackling undeclared work than other measures which seek to transfer such endeavour into 
the declared realm.  
To achieve a holistic approach in more member states, it will be necessary to give 
priority to pursuing a more coordinated strategic approach. This is because the limited 
range of policy measures used is likely to be due to the lack of a strategic coordinated 
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approach in member states. A fragmented departmental ‘silos’ approach results in 
enforcement authorities, such as labour inspectorates and tax administrations, continuing 
to adopt strategic objectives limited to eradicating undeclared work and therefore relying 
on deterrents. Consequently, despite article 1 of Decision (EU) 2016/3441 establishing 
the Platform stating that ‘”tackling”, in relation to undeclared work, means preventing, 
deterring and combating undeclared work as well as promoting the declaration of 
undeclared work’, most enforcement authorities and Ministries remain narrowly focused 
upon deterring rather than ‘preventing’ undeclared work, and ‘promoting the declaration 
of declared work’.   
To move beyond the current situation where deterrence measures are assumed to be 
the most important and effective type of policy measure, therefore, and towards a more 
evidence-based holistic policy approach, it will be necessary for a strategic coordinated 
approach to be adopted at the national level so that a more holistic approach can be 
adopted across government. To further enable this to happen, moreover, there will be a 
need for further research on the impact of individual policy measures. Until now, one of 
the main reasons that member states view deterrence measures as more important and 
effective is due to the lack of ex-ante and ex-post evaluation of not only individual policy 
measures, but also which sequences most effectively facilitate the transformation of 
undeclared work into declared work. If this paper therefore encourages governments to 
pursue a more coordinated strategic whole government approach towards tackling 
undeclared work, then one of its intentions will have been achieved. If it also encourages 
greater evaluation of the effectiveness of deterrence and other policy measures in 
tackling undeclared work, then it will have achieved its wider intention. 
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